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Abstract This paper considers the application of randomised controlled trials
(RCTs) to improve public systems in developing countries. Arguing that existing
critiques of RCTs as to problems with extrapolation and narrowness of scope are
especially relevant in this context, I consider the claim that these shortcomings can
be ameliorated through better causal explanations. I analyse how theoretical
mathematical models are used to construct causal explanations, and argue that it is
still difficult to extrapolate or address the subjectivity inherent in the choice of
interventions. I illustrate these arguments using two prominent RCTs that have
trialled interventions to improve government schools in India.
Keywords Randomised controlled trial  Causal inference  Theoretical model 
Public system  Development economics
JEL Classification B41  C90  O20
1 Introduction
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are advocated as an ideal tool for evaluating
social policies (Haynes et al. 2012) because they can enable unbiased estimation of
treatment effects. This advocacy extends to contemporary development economics
(e.g. Banerjee and Duflo 2011), where the design of effective policy often aims to
improve public systems.
This paper takes forward existing arguments on the nature of RCTs to develop a
critique of their use as the preeminent research tool for improving public systems in
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developing countries. Debates on the usefulness of RCTs centre on concerns about
internal and external validity (Worrall 2007; Cartwright 2007, 2011). There is also
the tendency to ask narrow questions (Reddy 2012; Rodrik 2009), leading to policy
prescriptions that are circumscribed in ways seldom articulated (Favereau 2014).
Our focus are the twin forms of extrapolation required to get from experimental
results to effective policy: from experimental to target context, and from the
intervention tested to the version that actually manifests in policy. The former is
concerned with the problem of external validity, while the latter addresses the
problem of asking narrow questions. The first part of our argument demonstrates
why both types of extrapolation are particularly tenuous in developing country
contexts when the aim is to improve public systems. Test contexts usually bear
structural differences to a target public system, because the latter involve
governance structures and multiple layers of actors that test contexts do not.
Furthermore, the feasibility requirements for RCTs lead to important differences
between tested interventions and emergent or recommended policies.
Both arguments, however, are not absolute. Understanding the causal processes
underlying responses to a tested intervention could help extrapolate to a different
but related policy, and to a structurally distinct context. As Deaton (2010a, 2010)
has argued, the belief that results in an experimental setting will hold across
different contexts could be strengthened by explaining the associated causal
mechanism, and how it functions in the settings to which extrapolation is desired.
Similarly, by making explicit any underlying assumptions, causal explanations can
aid informed guesses about a larger set of interventions similar to the one actually
tested. Indeed, in the absence of theory, the ‘radical skepticism’ that threatens the
internal validity of observational studies also threatens the external validity of
experimental results (Stokes 2014; Barrett and Carter 2014). Therefore, the second
part of my argument examines this claim: whether causal explanations in the form
of models can strengthen extrapolation from test to target context, and from tested
intervention to actual policy.
I illustrate these arguments using two prominent papers in the RCT literature, viz.
Remedying Education: Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments in India by
Banerjee, Cole, Duflo and Linden (2007; hereon BCDL) and Incentives Work:
Getting Teachers to Come to School by Duflo, Hanna and Ryan (2012; hereon
DHR). Both studies report on RCTs to improve government schools in India, and
offer corresponding policy prescriptions. They illustrate contemporary practice in
development economics where the goal is to evaluate policies that can improve a
public system. And they demonstrate the arguments by which an intervention is
chosen, how results are analysed and conclusions inferred, and how these are used
to make policy recommendations. While BCDL is a purely empirical study, DHR
provide a theoretical model as causal explanation. This model motivates both the
choice of intervention and the interpretation of results, and enables us to observe the
ability of models to address extrapolation challenges.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the
BCDL and DHR case studies and their appropriateness to illustrate my arguments.
Section 3 reviews existing perspectives on the kinds of research questions
amenable to RCTs, and explains how these apply to public systems in developing
84 Econ Polit (2016) 33:83–98
123
countries. Section 4 focuses on the challenges of extrapolation in the context of
such public systems, examining DHR and BCDL’s findings, inference, and
emergent policy recommendations. Section 5 then examines the case for
theoretical explanations as a way of mitigating the criticisms surrounding
extrapolation by delving into the nature of theory and theoretical models in
economics. Section 6 concludes.
2 Case studies
Public systems of education in developing countries are frequently the subject of
debates about quality and efficiency. Some of the important challenges these
systems face include poor student learning outcomes (UNESCO 2005), poor
nutrition and mortality among children (Black et al. 2003), and high teacher
absenteeism (Kremer et al. 2005). A growing literature has analyzed the effects of
reform-oriented interventions tested through randomised trials in these contexts.
One category of interventions involves providing materials and other inputs. For
instance, Miguel and Kremer (2004) measure the impact of deworming medication
on school participation, and Glewwe et al. (2004) examine whether flipcharts
improve test scores. A second category of intervention takes the form of monetary
incentives for teachers (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011) or for students
(Blimpo 2014).
Within this literature, I believe that BCDL and DHR’s approach and analysis are
sufficiently characteristic so as to be useful as case studies, and the positive attention
they have garnered in academic and development fora highlights their influence.1
Both studies focus on the India’s government schools, test distinct interventions in
different settings, yet offer very similar policy recommendations. BCDL test an
input-based intervention, introducing an auxiliary teacher into the classroom, while
DHR test an incentive-payment scheme aimed at cutting teacher absenteeism. Their
policy recommendations are system-wide, in that they recommend the hiring of
contractual teachers, with implications for teacher recruitment and remuneration
policies, and the role of teacher training institutions and qualifications frameworks.
This systemic nature of their recommendations enables us to examine the nature of
inference from results to policy recommendations, and the type of extrapolation
required to believe in their external validity.
2.1 The Balsakhi study
BCDL report the effects of two classroom-based interventions on student
achievement scores. The main intervention focused on remedial teaching, wherein
an auxiliary teacher—the Balsakhi (literally ‘child’s friend’)—worked with children
who were performing worse than their peers on basic skills, teaching them as a
1 BCDL have received wide publicity and evinced interest as a case study in the UNESCO’s Education
For All report (UNESCO 2005) and the World Bank’s World Development Report (World Bank 2003).
Likewise, DHR have been hailed for displaying good practice (Guerrero et al. 2012; Armstrong 2006),
and for their provision of a theoretical model that explains teachers’ behavior (Deaton 2010a, p. 449).
Econ Polit (2016) 33:83–98 85
123
separate group during regular school hours.2 The RCT was conducted in municipal
schools in two cities in western India. Unlike regular teachers, Balsakhis were
young women from the local community typically educated up to secondary school.
They were given two weeks of training and ongoing support by a Non-Government
Organisation (NGO) that ran the programme.
Schools were randomly allocated to treatment, and in treatment schools the
intervention took place in grade 3 or 4, while in control schools teaching proceeded
as usual. After the first two years of the programme, students in treatment schools
performed better than their control-school peers, almost entirely due to an increase
in test scores for the students taught by the Balsakhis. Only a small part of the
increase in test scores was found to persist a year after the intervention had ceased, a
finding that the authors discuss in detail, albeit without a conclusive recommen-
dation. I discuss these findings and the resultant policy recommendations in greater
detail below, in Sect. 4.1.
2.2 The camera study
DHR report the effects of an incentive-payment intervention aimed at cutting
teacher absenteeism. The study was conducted in rural Non Formal Education
(NFE) centers run by an NGO in the state of Rajasthan. These are single-teacher
centers for children who do not attend regular school, and the NGO aims to have
these children enroll in a government school upon completion of the NFE
programme. Under the intervention, teachers’ salaries were linked to their
absenteeism. In addition to a fixed sum, they received a per-day payment if they
were present in class for more than ten days in the month. NFE centers were
randomly allocated to treatment, and control group teachers received a fixed sum
each month irrespective of attendance. To establish attendance, teachers used a
camera to take date-stamped photographs of themselves together with all the
children present, at the beginning and end of each day.
To interpret any change in absenteeism behavior, DHR propose a principal-agent
model as a causal explanation. In this model, teachers are imperfectly monitored by
the NGO, and both parties seek to maximise their respective utilities. Each day,
teachers decide on whether to work by trading off the utility gained from leisure if
they skip work against the loss in payment they would incur, besides a small risk of
being fired or reprimanded. The NGO gains utility from teachers being present
because it values children’s learning, and trades this off against the salaries it must
pay to teachers. This model is discussed in greater detail below (Sect. 5.2) where I
relate it to the nature of economic theory more generally.
2 This (the Balsakhi) intervention forms the basis for the authors’ policy recommendations. The second
intervention was a computer-aided learning programme which also led to higher test scores for students,
but was substantially more expensive than the Balsakhi.
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2.3 Locating the interventions
The policy focus for both studies is the Indian government school system. It
employs 4.6 million teachers in over a million schools (NUEPA 2014), and has
widely acknowledged shortcomings in the quality of teaching and learning
provided. For example, as of 2005, 53 % of children had dropped out before
completing grade VIII (NCERT 2006), and as of 2012, nearly one in every five
children enrolled in grade one failed to complete primary school (NUEPA 2014).
An extensive system of academic and executive infrastructure supports the
provision of school education. The academic part consists of the National and State
Councils for Educational Research and Training (NCERT and SCERTs, respec-
tively) and District Institutes for Education and Training (DIETs). Together, these
institutions are responsible for developing curricula and teaching-learning materials,
teacher training, academic support and research. The executive infrastructure
consists of directorates and secretariats of education in each provincial state. These
multiple layers and inter-state differences result in variation in the quality of
government schooling (De et al. 2011). Overall, education is the joint responsibility
of state and federal governments, with the majority of funding provided by state
governments together with periodic federally-funded schemes.
This level of complexity is, I would argue, characteristic of similar public
systems such as health and various types of governance. Therefore, it is a useful site
to interrogate the ability of RCT interventions to improve, or at least take into
account systemic structures if these interventions are to yield sustainable
improvements once translated into policy.
3 Questions for methods
RCTs, and experiments more generally, seek to analyze the effects of causes
(Holland 1986). Using them to address problems in developing countries,
researchers first describe a particular problem, and then suggest a potential solution
in the form of an intervention that needs testing.3 This approach is useful provided
the problems themselves are understood well enough to allow hypothesizing ways
of addressing them. Even with such understanding, RCTs are subject to
implementation constraints that might limit the sorts of interventions actually
tested (Reddy 2012).
Public systems are a case in point, where a single such system might rely on
several interlinked factors. These can include the availability of financial resources,
physical infrastructure such as buildings, transport and electricity, an atmosphere of
work ethic and a lack of corruption. Any assessment of the whole system must take
into account all constituent attributes, else policy changes might not yield expected
3 This paper does not focus on the behavioural underpinnings of RCTs in social contexts, but it is worth
noting that RCTs here are often behaviourally-motivated. The wider debate here includes the question of
‘nudge’ vs. ‘boost’ understandings of human decision making (e.g. Gru¨ne-Yanoff and Hertwig 2015).
Indeed, Davis (2013) argues that several RCT interventions in behavioural development economics are
‘nudges’, and as paternalistic policy prescriptions are liable to social and cultural imperialism.
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benefits in the presence of, say, poor procurement policies that are prone to
corruption. An RCT aimed at improving a public system would typically focus on
changing a single attribute (e.g. teacher absenteeism) within this system, and gauge
how this perturbation changes some set of outcomes (e.g. learning outcomes). This
approach tends to neglect those parts of the system that influence the outcome less
directly, and the interlinkages between these parts (e.g. teacher training institutions,
teachers’ qualifications, school curricula and examinations). Time and feasibility
constraints also restrict the choice of interventions. For instance, changes to teacher
education curricula or recruitment policy take long to manifest, and are difficult to
implement experimentally because they require sustained political consent and
cross-departmental collaboration. Consequently, as a recent review by Kremer et al.
(2013) demonstrates, they are unlikely to be chosen for RCTs.
Justifying their choice of interventions, BCDL explain that children do not learn
well in government schools because (a) they are first generation learners lacking
parental support; (b) curriculum and pedagogy are unsuited to their needs; (c) ‘the
school system continues to operate as if it were catering to the elite’. Having
discussed mixed evidence on the usefulness of inputs such as textbooks, they
suggest that ‘...inputs specifically targeted to helping weaker students learn may be
effective’ before introducing the Balsakhi.
Similarly, DHR describe the problem of teacher absenteeism in government
schools, which is hard to tackle because ‘teachers are a powerful political force, able
to resist attempts to enforce stricter attendance rules’ due to which ‘many
governments have shifted to instead hiring ‘‘para-teachers’’’ (p. 1241). Presenting a
theoretical model that parametrizes teachers’ response to financial incentives, they
suggest a payment-incentive scheme as an intervention to curtail absenteeism.
The ‘para’ teachers referred to are contractually-appointed teachers who are paid
a fraction of the salary that regular teachers receive (Govinda and Josephine 2004).
While the latter are typically graduates with a teacher training qualification, para
teachers are school graduates with minimal teacher training. Owing to fiscal
pressures, certain Indian provincial state governments have recruited para teachers
from the 1990s onwards (Kingdon and Sipahimalani-Rao 2010), and they constitute
nearly a tenth of all government teachers (NUEPA 2014).
This concurrent recruitment of para teachers highlights a tension in policy. On
the one hand, policy guidelines—e.g. the National Policy on Education 1986
(Government ofIndia 1998) and National Curriculum Framework 2005 (NCERT
2006)—ask that teachers be viewed as professionals, with rigorous selection,
certification and remuneration. On the other, a low-skill, low-pay view of teachers
lends credence to an instrumental, cost-minimizing view of education (Kumar et al.
2001) which has been criticised for suggesting that ‘anyone can teach’ (Halperin
and Ratteree 2003).
In other words, the debate on how best to improve government schools has an
important ideological divide, and viewing it agnostically, neither approach can be
ruled out a priori, and both ought to be empirically evaluated. Yet only one of these
approaches is feasible for randomisation, since testing whether teachers-as-
professionals work better requires systemic changes that cannot be implemented
locally. Thus, we contend that BCDL’s choice of para teacher-like Balsakhis and
88 Econ Polit (2016) 33:83–98
123
DHR’s advocacy for para teachers represents an important normative judgement
which is brought about at least in part by their choice of method. Similar arguments
would apply to public systems of health and governance, with the more general
contention that preferring RCTs biases enquiries into, and efforts to reform, public
systems. In the case of developing countries, fundamental questions about how to
organise public systems are often still open to debate—as the para-teacher case
illustrates—when these systems are still in the process of being built. This makes
any bias arising from the choice of research method even more significant.
I now turn to the question of external validity from experimental results. I first
examine existing arguments to explain why concerns about the twin forms of
extrapolation referred to above—test to target, and tested intervention to actual
policy—are particularly relevant to public systems.
4 From results to policy
Worrall (2007) and Cartwright (2007, 2011) have explained why findings from
RCTs should not be ranked any higher than other forms of evidence. Briefly, this is
because the process of moving from empirical evidence to a useful causal
conclusion requires the test population to be suitably similar to the target population
for which the conclusion is desired. Even with perfect internal validity—perfect
randomization, and the absence of Hawthorne and John Henry effects—external
validity does not follow deductively. It remains dependent on the untestable as-
sumption that the same causal process will unfold in the target population as did in
the test one.
These arguments are particularly pertinent when the goal is to use RCTs to
inform policy for public systems. As in the case of BCDL, the test population could
be a subset of the target system. Alternatively, as with DHR who test their
intervention on NFE centres run by an NGO, the test context might be altogether
outside the target system. In both cases, the differences between test and target are
structural, and not only those of two distinct sets of subjects. The target population
is a superset of the test one, consisting of institutions, administrative structures and
their interlinkages, that is qualitatively distinct from the test site. Therefore,
extrapolating to the target population involves not only assumptions about why the
same causal process will work elsewhere (e.g. teachers in a different province to the
one where the RCT took place), but that this will work even after other parts of the
system become involved (e.g. institutions and bureaucrats hitherto uninvolved).
We now examine these steps for DHR and BCDL: the process of inferring from
empirical results, providing a causal explanation, and using this explanation as the
basis for policy recommendations.
4.1 The Balsakhi intervention
BCDL find that test scores went up in treatment schools relative to control schools,
and attribute this to the remedial teaching by Balsakhis. They conclude that ‘[I]n
terms of cost for a given improvement in test scores, scaling up the Balsakhi
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programme would thus be much more cost effective than hiring new teachers (since
reducing class size appears to have little or no impact on test scores)’ (p. 1263).
And, that ‘...these results suggest that it may be possible to dramatically increase the
quality of education in urban India...’ (p. 1263). That said, at no point were
additional regular teachers recruited, nor were they compared directly with
Balsakhis (e.g. through remedial teaching by regular teachers). Instead, the authors
found that test scores did not improve for the ‘not lagging behind’ children who did
not work with the Balsakhis in treatment schools. These children were in effect
‘treated’ (authors’ quotes) with smaller class size, since their lagging-behind peers
were working separately with the Balsakhi. Since this ‘treatment’ did not improve
test scores, the authors infer that hiring additional teachers would not be useful.
Accepting these policy recommendations requires different kinds of assumptions.
The first relate to the choice of intervention itself: specifically, the comparison with
its closest alternative: simply hiring more government school teachers. BCDL’s
logic for preferring the Balsakhi has two parts. First, that hiring more government
teachers would lead only to smaller class sizes. Since they found that smaller class
sizes had no effect on ‘non lagging behind’ children’s scores, they infer that the
same would likely hold true for smaller class sizes in general (where both lagging
and not-lagging children are taught together). And second, they implicitly assume
that remedial teaching by regular teachers would be less cost effective compared to
Balsakhis.
Notwithstanding, extrapolation from test to target context and intervention to
actual policy based on BCDL’s results requires an important assumption: that hiring
more Balsakhis will leave the behavior of existing teachers unchanged once
Balsakhis become part of official policy (or that any changes will not decrease the
gains to learning). In fact, regular teachers subsequently started to perceive
Balsakhis as a threat and protested against the programme, resulting in its closure in
Mumbai municipal schools in 2003 (Pallavi 2005). Thus in this particular case, the
existing political concerns within the system—presumably concerns about employ-
ment and professional identity—would need to be taken into account while
designing the test intervention and extrapolating from any findings.
We now turn to the DHR case study, where the test context lies outside the target
one, sidestepping any immediate problems of this kind, but calling for additional
assumptions to arrive at policy conclusions.
4.2 The camera intervention
DHR’s main finding is that absenteeism rates fell significantly in treatment schools
relative to control schools. Since the final outcome of interest is students’ learning,
they demonstrate that test scores also witnessed a corresponding increase. That is,
teachers maintained sufficient ‘effort’ while in school, enabling the increase in their
presence to translate into more learning.
DHR’s main conclusions are that
...the barriers currently preventing teachers from attending school regularly
(e.g., distance, other activities) are not insurmountable. Given political will, it
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is possible that solutions to the absence problem could be found in government
schools as well.
...para-teachers can be effective. If implementing monitoring within the
government system turns out to be impossible, our results provide support for
the policy of increasing teaching staff through the hiring of para-teachers.
(DHR, p. 1276)
As noted above, the test population is a group of teachers in Non Formal
Education centers run by an NGO in western India, while the policy target are
teachers in (formal) government schools. Their main policy recommendation—for
para teachers in the government school system—rests on three assumptions. The
first assumption is implicit and relates directly to our argument about choice of
interventions: the assumption that para teachers, potentially coupled with absen-
teeism-checking mechanisms, are better than existing government school teachers.
As with BCDL, this is a normative assumption upon which the policy recommen-
dations of the study crucially hinge, yet DHR do not provide direct or indirect
evidence in support of it, since the study neither deals with government school
teachers nor compares them with the test population of NFE teachers. In order to
accept this assumption, we must first accept that candidate policies are to be drawn
from a restricted pool that excludes, for example, changes to teacher training, school
curricula and various corresponding institutions.
The second and third assumptions correspond to the twin forms of extrapolation
referred to earlier: that similar results would maintain in the distinctly different
policy target context of government schools, and that it would be feasible to
implement similar schemes to check the absenteeism behavior of government
school para teachers.
DHR also present a theoretical model as the causal explanation for why teacher
absenteeism fell in response to the intervention. Any objections to their policy
recommendations—including our criticism of their restricted intervention choice—
would be less relevant if this explanation could be used to (a) predict how
government school teachers will respond to a similar absenteeism-curbing policy;
and (b) compare para teachers with government school teachers in terms of
children’s learning net of any absenteeism differences. This brings us to the second
part of our argument that focuses on the role of theoretical explanations and their
ability to strengthen extrapolation.
5 The role of theory
In his celebrated critique of RCTs and econometric practice more generally, Deaton
(2010a, p. 452) appeals for better causal explanations, stating that ‘...we are unlikely
to banish poverty in the modern world by [randomised controlled] trials alone,
unless those trials are guided by and contribute to theoretical understanding.’
Related to this is Harrison’s (2013) critique of current practice in field experiments,
who argues that causal evidence of a change in average outcomes, while far from
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being the only interesting kind of inference, needs economic theory to explain why
human beings responded in a certain way to some policy.
Do or can theoretical models fulfill this role, and equip us to make plausible
guesses about how a given intervention will play out in the target population and
how it will compare with others? Our claim is that in general the answer is no when
the aim is to generalise from RCT results to policy advice for developing country
public systems. The answer cannot be definitive because the notion of a theory or
theoretical model can, in principle, always be made sufficiently rich so as to always
succeed in gleaning a useful nugget of knowledge from any piece of evidence, such
as from an internally-valid RCT. Instead, our task is to examine this question with
regard to theory as it currently exists within the discipline of economics, in the form
of mathematico-deductive theoretical models.
5.1 Models in economics
Heckman’s (2005, p. 2) explanation of causality introduces models as ‘...a set of
possible counterfactual worlds constructed under some rules’, which as he explains,
are an essential prerequisite for conceptualizing causality. Models are the opposite
of a black-box; replacing unknown relationships with known, or at least
hypothesised connections between different variables and processes that influence
one another. Given that the usefulness of an RCT rests on the continued validity of
its findings over time, in different places, or with different people, models could aid
both in conceptualizing and in assessing this generalizability. They might help think
through the preconditions necessary for a certain bit of extrapolation, or how an
intervention might need to be amended or supplemented under different circum-
stances. This view is echoed by Deaton (2010a), who, like Harrison (2013), focuses
not so much on an exposition of the relationship between models and causality so
much as on the need for a causal understanding for producing credible knowledge
and drawing policy-relevant conclusions. The emphasis here is on constructing
theoretical mechanisms through which successive research studies can progressively
refine interventions in Popperian fashion.
Such models are usually mathematico-deductive in nature, and consist of rules by
which agents interact with other and with institutions (e.g. a company or NGO),
typically governed by a set of constraints. Within a model, agents are assigned
behavioural rules, which for individuals usually entail complete rationality or
carefully defined departures from this.4 The rules by which agents interact form
‘logically consistent systems within which hypothetical ‘‘thought experiments’’ can
be conducted’ (Heckman 2000, p. 46), and they constitute the bulk of theory in
most economics practice. The outcomes of these interactions—and predictions of
the model—come about by using comparative statics to analyze the collective
interplay of different actors and constraints in the model. Such a model can also be
used to define a structural econometric model, to help analyze data in a way that
4 Rationality has been criticised for being unrealistic (Sen 1977), but also for being at odds with the
‘ecological rationality’ that exists in societies with non-liberal economic relationships (Davis 2013).
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makes explicit the distinction between association and causation (Moneta and Russo
2014; Deaton 2010) as in DHR’s model.
5.2 Models for RCTs
A priori, there is no binding link between a given methodology and the type of
model chosen to explain the causal connections this methodology seeks to uncover.
A causal explanation for the findings of an RCT could thus be built, in principal,
using a sufficiently detailed model. Such a model could help in analyzing the
generalizability of any findings by capturing relevant preconditions and contextual
factors in test and target populations.
Rubinstein (2006) states that as a first step towards hypothesizing useful
explanations, a model should yield conclusions that are consistent with observed
phenomenon. Sugden (2009) goes further, arguing that while models aim to provide
explanations about the real world, model-builders usually hesitate to claim this
explicitly. Indeed ‘within economics, explicit discussion of the relationship between
a model and the corresponding real-world phenomena is not required’ (p. 9,
author’s emphasis). Instead, Sugden suggests, models can be thought of as ‘credible
worlds’, i.e. fully functional constructions in themselves and not simplified versions
of the real world. The model builder, in such cases, generally leaves unstated the
inferential leap from model to causal explanation for real world phenomena. How
does this view apply to the model offered by DHR?
As described in Sect. 2.2, DHR’s model consists of a principal-agent setup where
teachers maximise their utility and are imperfectly monitored by the NGO. In this
mathematico-deductive model world, control group teachers face a simple tradeoff
between a day’s leisure and the chance of being rebuked if caught while absent.
Treatment group teachers face a dynamic incentive on account of the per-day
payment they receive (for every day they are present beyond an initial ten days in
the month), and they decide on whether to attend by weighing the benefit of an
additional day’s salary against the value of leisure and the chance of being rebuked
or fired. For all teachers, the value of leisure is hypothesised net of any intrinsic
reward from teaching. Teachers were given an achievement test as part of the study,
and their test score is assumed to proxy their intrinsic reward from teaching ‘to
control for the fact that teachers with higher scores may be more diligent and thus
may work more often.’ (p. 1258). The model does not consider systemic attributes
of the kind government schools might be expected to have, including higher levels
of administration, teacher deployment and in-service training, or potential variation
in the profiles of children being taught.
5.2.1 Credible worlds
Under Sugden’s credible-worlds view, this model must in fact constitute a self-
contained universe with NFE teachers and the NGO as the main actors. Sugden also
states that most models in economics are not accompanied by an explicit declaration
or explanation pointing out the correspondence with the real world we might believe
they are intended to represent.
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DHR’s model conforms to this: the authors do not declare how to infer from their
model to the real world; either that of the NFE schools, or more importantly
government schools, the policy focus of their analysis. Indeed, their model does not
consider aspects or actors beyond teachers and a monitoring authority. If the model
is intended as a bridge between context-specific results and the target public system,
this bridge does not attempt to describe that target system. Viewed in terms of the
structural versus reduced-form debate (Chetty 2009; Heckman 2010), accounting
for the public system here would be akin to a ‘super-structural’ model. This would
describe not just the variables that jointly determine absenteeism behavior in the test
context—a simple structural model like the one provided—but also all relevant
variables in the target public system.
To be clear, this point is distinct from the idea that DHR’s model employs
unrealistic assumptions. Economic models do so in general, and as Ma¨ki (2009)
explains, it is mistaken to argue that such lack of realism makes models any less
useful. Models attempt to isolate hypothesised mechanisms, and their usefulness is
largely independent of the realism of their assumptions. Instead, my suggestion is
that DHR’s model does not consider the target (public) system at all. And, that since
this is due in part to the complexity of such systems relative to the model-building
tools employed in economics, this inability will likely be a characteristic of models
in general.
But, this criticism could be weakened if the causal mechanism inside the model-
world also operates in the target system. A similar treatment effect would manifest
in the target system provided that target is free of interfering factors. In the case of
DHR, the policy recommendation of incentive-based salaries for teachers in the
government education system might yield results similar to the tested intervention
provided there are no new variables in this larger system which influence
absenteeism. Nancy Cartwright (2009) makes this condition precise.
5.2.2 Isolating mechanisms
Cartwright suggests that models attempt to isolate key mechanisms that do actually
function in the real world, and that doing so lets us study the effects of a ‘capacity’.
In DHR’s model, the capacity of interest is the incentive-payment scheme, and their
model offers a mechanism for its effect on absenteeism. For the model’s explanation
to be useful, it is necessary to eliminate all confounding factors or assume that they
are orthogonal to the treatment mechanism. So, since the DHR model ignores
teacher training and governance structures (say), these must not be factors that
shape the link between incentive pay and absenteeism, neither with these NFE
teachers, nor—because the model must extrapolate to the government schools they
offer policy prescriptions for—for government school teachers.
But to isolate key mechanisms, Cartwright explains, economic models tend to
invoke several structural assumptions. These are needed because economics lacks a
useful body of general principles (unlike the physical sciences), muddying the task
of extrapolation because valid inference from model to real world depends on the
validity of these structural assumptions. In DHR’s model, the primary structural
assumptions are utility maximizing behavior by the teachers, and an absence of any
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influences on their behavior other than those included in the model. Extrapolating to
government schools requires believing that this behavior stays invariant for teachers
in government schools, and moreover, that its ultimate influence on teaching and
thus learning remains invariant to any confounding influences in this alternative
context. The latter include teachers’ characteristics and those of the children they
teach, school organization and administrative structures.
Similar assumptions would need to be made for any RCT that focuses on
individuals but whose target in terms of policy advice through extrapolation is a
larger system. Here, the theoretical model must not only set out the key structural
assumptions that explain causal mechanisms within the experimental context, but
also any additional structural assumptions that are important characteristics of the
target system. Since the experimental context is, by design and feasibility
restrictions, often very different from the target context, this places a substantial
onus on the model. DHR’s model effectively illustrates the challenge of doing this
using the tools of theoretical modeling as they currently exist in economics. Here
and more generally, it is difficult to account for the structural assumptions and
characteristics of a target public system, or alternatively to build a ‘credible world’
representation of it, where inference from model-plus-experimental results to the
real world can be justified through explicit, plausible assumptions.
6 Conclusion
I have argued why RCTs should not be granted the status of preferred method for
evaluating policies aimed at improving public systems in developing countries. The
set of interventions that are amenable to randomization is a restricted set owing to
the need for feasibility, both in terms of scale and time. When a public system is the
target of a policy evaluation exercise, this restriction means that the intervention
actually tested tends to ignore how the system is organised, and is implemented only
for the last tier of workers. The necessity of choosing from a restricted set of
interventions also implies that normative judgements must be made regarding the
choice of candidate intervention, and these judgements are seldom made evident in
a discussion of the findings.
Two types of extrapolation are required for effective policy to emerge from
research findings: from the test to target—public system—context, and from the
tested intervention to the version of it that actually follows in policy. I have argued
as to the challenges of doing so based on results from RCTs, and have illustrated
how important yet unstated and untestable assumptions are needed to believe that a
similar causal mechanism will still operate once other layers of a system become
involved.
Clearly, these criticisms could be weakened or alleviated if sufficiently detailed
causal explanations existed. The process and validity of extrapolating from test to
target context could be appraised by comparing these twin contexts from the
perspective of a known causal mechanism. And, once this mechanism is identified,
it would be possible to assess an allied set of interventions known to have certain
features in common with the intervention actually tested, thereby easing the
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problems of both normative judgement in choosing an intervention and of the
constraints imposed by feasibility.
In response, I have explained how the contemporary form of causal explanations
in economics does not permit for modeling complex systems with multiple
constraints, incentives, and agents. Current best practice, as illustrated by DHR’s
theoretical model, usually explains select features of observed behavior through a
framework of utility-maximization or careful deviations therefrom. At best, such
practice can provide a causal explanation for what is observed in a subset of a public
system, but it does not discuss the validity of extrapolating to other parts of the
system, nor how the hypothesised ‘capacities’ might operate in the target context.
As a result, the problems associated with extrapolating from experimental results
continue to be serious concerns, and particularly so when public systems are the
target of that extrapolation.
In principle, this criticism can be levelled against any attempt to design policy for
a public system based on findings from a small, potentially different test context.
What makes public systems in developing countries stand out is that these are often
still in the process of being established, and they might lack basic levels of
functional competence. Critically, fundamental questions about their role and
organisation might still be open to debate: the role of private delivery, how to
organise governance structures, and the numbers, type, and qualifications of
personnel needed. This undecidedness puts a distinct onus on research leading to
policy prescriptions, as we have critically analysed in the case of contractual
teachers and their role within a government school system. Any claim to the
preeminence of a methodology must reflect its ability to evaluate a wide range of
policies, and provide a valid conceptual if not empirical basis to extrapolate from
test to target. It is in this regard that the claim towards RCTs as preferred method is
problematic.
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